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Abstract 
In addition to initial financing, venture capital (VC) firms also provide other value-added 
contributions. Many VC firms and their portfolio companies consider these value-added 
contributions the most significant contributions VC firms make. The value-added contributions 
have been found to be different depending on whether the VC firm is a “traditional” VC firm or 
“corporate” venture capital (CVC) firm. Traditional VC and CVC firms have different 
investment objectives and possess different areas of expertise, leading to differences in the value-
added contributions provided. The differences in the value-added contributions raise the question 
of whether the performance of portfolio firms is affected by the type of venture capital backer. 
This study seeks to 1) quantify the impact of VC-affiliation on portfolio firm performance, and 2) 
compare the differences in performance of VC and CVC firms’ portfolio companies.  
The paper examines the financial performance, IPO valuation, and stock performance of 
VC-backed, CVC-backed, and independent companies in the 3-year period following an IPO. 
The years 1998, 1999, and 2002 (representing the height of the tech bubble and bear market of 
the early 2000s recession) were chosen as the sample period.  
The results of the analysis indicate that VC-backed companies as a whole outperform 
independent companies in every aspect, confirming that the value-added contributions of VC 
firms help the performance of their portfolio companies. The performance of portfolio 
companies also differed depending on the type of their VC-backer. Traditional VC-backed 
portfolio companies had higher revenue growth and IPO valuations, while CVC-backed portfolio 
companies had higher net income growth and slightly better stock performance. Ultimately, the 
results confirm that VC firms improve portfolio company performance, and the impact of the VC 
firm’s value-added contributions differs depending on the type of VC-backing.  
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Introduction  
 The venture capital industry is a significant driver of growth and innovation in the United 
States’ economy. Many of today’s largest and most admired companies were once funded by 
venture capitalists, such as Apple Inc, Cisco Systems, Google, and Yahoo. Many more smaller, 
lesser known companies were also once part of a venture capital firm’s portfolio. Venture capital 
firms contribute to these companies’ success not only through providing capital, but also through 
providing other services to ensure the new venture’s survival and success (Hellman & Puri 2002; 
Barney et al 1996; Sapienza & Manigart 1996). These additional value-added contributions are 
considered to be most significant contributions by both the VC firms as well as entrepreneurs of 
new ventures. 
The venture capital industry can be segmented into two distinct areas: “traditional” 
venture capital (VC) and “corporate” venture capital (CVC) (Gompers & Lerner 1999). 
Traditional venture capital firms are typically organized as private partnerships, seek to 
maximize financial returns, and obtain funds from third party investors. Corporate venture 
capital firms are typically subsidiaries of corporations, seek to meet strategic as well as financial 
goals, and invest funds from the corporate parent (National Venture Capital Association). 
 Based on the distinction between VC and CVC firms, recent research has focused on 
developing theoretical bases for determining the sources of value-added contributions to 
portfolio firms (Maula 2001), as well quantitatively assessing different metrics of VC firms and 
portfolio companies, such the resource-bases, value-added contributions, objectives, investment 
areas, and firm performance (Maula et al 2001; Maula et al 2005; Markham 2005; Gompers & 
Lerner 1999; Bygrave & Timmons 1992). Such prior research has indicated that the two types of 
firms differ in the types of resources available to portfolio companies, the effectiveness at 
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different value-added contributions, and success in liquidation events. 
This study will build upon the existing research in the field through two areas. First, the 
study seeks to quantify the value-added contributions of venture capital firms on the performance 
of portfolio companies. Second, the study seeks to examine if there is a difference in the impact 
on the performance of portfolio companies depending on whether the VC firm is a traditional VC 
firm or CVC firm. The prior literature in this area will be reviewed to develop a theoretical basis, 
and a quantitative approach will then be developed to assess portfolio company performance, 
utilizing post-IPO financial performance, IPO valuation, and stock performance as comparison 
metrics. Finally, the implications of the results will be discussed. 
Distinguishing Features between Venture Capital and Corporate Venture Capital  
 Venture Capital  Corporate Venture Capital 
Organization  
Private partnerships; VC as general 
partner, investors as limited partners 
Subsidiaries of larger corporations 
Investment objective Primarily financial return Primarily strategic objectives 
Source of funds Investors Corporate parent 
 
Literature Review 
Value-Added Contributions of Venture Capitalists 
Given the impact a venture capitalist can have on the growth and development of new 
ventures, significant amounts of research on the venture capital industry has focused on 
identifying and understanding the value-added contributions of venture capitalists beyond pure 
financial support.  
The key contribution of venture capitalists is typically thought to be the financial 
resources invested in the new venture (Gompers & Lerner 1999). Although it is true that venture 
capitalists play a key role as the agent transferring capital from institutions with capital to 
entrepreneurs in search of capital, venture capitalists also provide additional value-added 
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contributions in addition to purely financial support (Hsu 2004, Bygraves & Timmons 1992).  
Venture capitalists are often actively involved in the enterprises in which they invest, 
offering guidance, know-how, industry contacts, and other such support. Serving as advisors to 
the new venture enables the venture capitalist to play the role of sounding board, marketing 
expert, management recruiter, and industry contact, among others. Lee et al (2004) found that 
linkage to venture capital firms had a significant positive effect on startup performance. Lindsey 
(2002) found that portfolio companies with a shared venture capital investor were more likely to 
form strategic partnerships and exchange technical and market information, highlighting the role 
of the venture capitalist as an information mediator. Bygraves & Timmons (1992) noted that 
entrepreneurs often saw their venture capital investors as objective outsiders with a depth of 
knowledge and experience in the industry and market, and utilized this role to test the reality of 
their business plans and ideas. Sapienza & Manigart (1996) found that VC firms typically 
believed their strategic involvement and networking center as the most important roles they 
served. Both Bygraves & Timmons (1992) and Hellman & Puri (2002) noted the role of the 
venture capitalist in recruiting knowledgeable management.  
However, the effectiveness of VC firms was found to be different depending on industry, 
as Lee et al (2001) found a positive effect on technology companies while Brau et al (2004) 
failed to find significant differences between VC and non-VC backed manufacturing companies. 
Barney et al (1996) found that the optimal level of VC activity depended upon the extent to 
which a portfolio company valued the VC’s input. Stuart et al (1999) documented the 
certification effect of venture capitalists, noting that affiliation with a VC firm provided 
legitimacy to the products of relatively unknown new ventures. Hsu (2004) sought to quantify 
the value of this type of venture capital support, finding that entrepreneurs were willing to accept 
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lower valuations of their startup in order to become affiliated with more reputable VC firms in 
order to access their resources and certification from being affiliated with them.  
Corporate Venture Capital versus Traditional Venture Capital 
With the growing influence of corporate venture capital, more research in the venture 
capital field has begun to examine this segment of the industry. Research in the field has covered 
the structure of the industry, the objectives and effectiveness of CVC activity, and the value-
added contributions of CVC. Hardymon et al (1983) wrote of the early cases of CVC failure. 
Gompers & Lerner (1999) examined the firm structure of different periods of CVC investment 
activity, finding that high failure rates among original CVC firms were due to a lack of well-
defined missions, inadequate corporate commitment, and poor compensation schemes. Newer 
CVC firms have tended to be more focused in their investment area, mainly firms in the high-
tech industries in the development stage. 
Markham et al (2005) discussed the role that external investments play in bringing new 
technologies into the parent corporation. Markham et al (2005) argued that such investments 
were mainly strategic moves to acquire new technologies, support the growth of business, and 
acquire greater financial and market information. Alvarez & Barney (2001) examined the 
relationship between entrepreneurs and CVC firms from the perspective of the entrepreneur, 
arguing that such alliances can create economic value for both parties, but in the long run such 
value can become appropriated by the larger firm. The most value-creation exists when there are 
complementary resources between the entrepreneur and corporation. Knyphausen-Aufseb (2002) 
argued that different types of CVC firms relied on different resource bases, finding that 
technology-based CVC firms provided the most value due to the significant resources invested in 
R&D and expertise in their respective technological fields. Maula (2001) examined the value-
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added contributions of CVC firms to technology start-ups, identifying resource acquisition, 
knowledge-acquisition, and endorsement benefits as the primary value-adding mechanisms. 
Maula (2001) also argued that CVCs possessed greater R&D resources, technological knowledge 
and expertise, and credibility in endorsing the technological and commercial quality of 
technology ventures than traditional venture capital firms.  
Differences in Value-Added Contributions 
Given the previous literature on the venture capital industry and the recent research on 
corporate venture capital, a natural progression is to draw comparisons between the two 
segments, their performance, and the performance of their portfolio companies. Maula et al 
(2005) sought to compare the value-added contributions of VC and CVC investors, theorizing 
that the financial, social, and knowledge resources of the firms influenced the nature and quality 
of value-added contributions. Maula et al (2005) found that the resources possessed by the 
venture capital firms were different but complementary, resulting in better quality of value-added 
effectiveness when both types were present in a portfolio company.  
VC firms were found to be superior in many of the traditional services provided by 
venture capitalists, such as arranging financing, recruiting key employees, advising on 
competition, and developing the organizational resources of the firm. Such contributions were 
termed “enterprise nurturing,” or helping a new venture avoid mistakes to which new businesses 
are vulnerable. Corporate venture capital firms were found to be better at “commerce building” 
activities, focusing on revenue generating activities such as attracting foreign customers, 
developing distribution channels, stimulation of business from initial orders, as well as 
technological support through the support of the parent corporation’s R&D resources as well as 
certification from an established market player (Maula et al 2005, Knyphausen-Aufseb 2002). 
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Literature Summary  
The literature on the venture capital industry shows that there are significant value-added 
contributions made by venture firms outside of mere financing, and there are also differences 
between traditional venture capital and corporate venture capital firms. Three key aspects where 
traditional venture capital and corporate venture capital firms differ are: 1) investment objectives, 
2) firm resources, and 3) value-added contributions. The differences in venture capital and 
corporate venture capital firms in these areas are summarized in following table. 
Summary of Differences in Resources and Value-Added Contributions 
 Venture Capital Corporate Venture Capital 
Investment 
Objective 
Primarily financial return Primarily strategic objectives 
Firm 
Resources 
1. Strong network within financial markets 
2. Broad network in multiple industries  
3. Contacts with similar or complementary 
ventures with VC firm’s portfolio 
4. Extensive experience in developing 
competitive position in new market 
1. Support of parent corporation’s R&D 
capabilities 
2. Specific industry and technological 
expertise 
3. Strong network within industry 
4. Recognized reputation within industry  
Value-added 
Contributions 
1. Better at strategic planning and advising on 
competition 
2. More effective at management recruiting 
3. More effective at obtaining additional 
financing 
4. Developing the organizational resources of 
the firm 
1. Reputation effects resulting from 
cooperation with an established player 
2. Stimulation of business by initial orders 
3. Access to distribution channels 
4. Development of products/services 
5. Arrangement of industry relationships 
 
 Given the evidence of the value-added contributions of VC firms, and the differences in 
investment objectives, firm resources, and value-added contributions between traditional VC and 
CVC firms, how does this affect the performance of portfolio companies? Thus, this study will 
examine two main issues: 
1. Quantifying the impact of a VC firm’s value-added contributions on portfolio company 
performance 
2. Quantifying the differences of traditional VC and CVC firm’s valued-added contributions 
on portfolio company performance  
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Three metrics were chosen to measure the impact of venture capital firms. Financial 
performance post-IPO, i.e. revenues and net income, examine the business performance and 
success of a portfolio company. IPO valuations examine the market’s evaluation of the new 
venture. Stock returns measure the market performance of portfolio companies. 
 
Hypotheses 
There are two general hypotheses that were formed regarding the performance of VC-
backed portfolio companies. First, as the venture capitalist’s role is not solely limited to 
providing financing to a new venture, but also to help the new venture grow and succeed as a 
company, the value-added contributions of a VC firm should enable a portfolio company to 
perform better than independent companies without VC-backing. Second, given the differing 
investment objectives, firm resources, and value-added contributions of VC and CVC firms, such 
differences should be reflected in the performance of their portfolio companies. Based on these 
two general hypotheses, two sets of hypotheses have been developed, comparing VC-backed 
portfolio companies to independent companies, and comparing traditional VC-backed portfolio 
companies to CVC-backed portfolio companies. 
The first set of hypotheses examines the performance of VC-backed portfolio companies 
compared to independent companies. Because of the value-added contributions of the venture 
capital firms, and the resources that portfolio companies can draw upon, the performance of VC-
backed portfolio companies should exceed that of independent companies in all aspects. Thus: 
H1:  VC-backed portfolio companies will have higher revenue growth post-IPO than 
independent portfolio companies. 
H2:  VC-backed portfolio companies will have higher net income growth post-IPO than 
independent portfolio companies. 
  
8 
H3:  VC-backed portfolio companies will have a higher IPO valuation, based on price-to-
sales valuation ratio. 
H4:  VC-backed portfolio companies will have higher stock returns post-IPO than the 
overall market. 
The second set of hypotheses compares the performance of VC-backed portfolio 
companies and CVC-backed portfolio companies. In examining a CVC firm’s investment 
objectives, the CVC firm is primarily concerned with strategic objectives, and will concentrate 
resources to activities that help achieve those objectives, such as R&D, developing customer 
bases, or distribution channels. The resources controlled by CVC firms contribute to activities 
that enable commerce-building, or the ability to develop revenue streams. The value-added 
contributions of CVC firms further enable revenue growth, as CVC firms can provide technical 
advice, access to distribution channels, and certification of portfolio companies from an 
established industry player. Thus, the focus on commerce-building activities should enable CVC-
backed portfolio companies to achieve faster revenue and net income growth than VC-backed 
portfolio companies. 
H5:  CVC-backed portfolio companies will have higher revenue growth post-IPO than 
traditional VC-backed portfolio companies. 
H6:  CVC-backed portfolio companies will have higher net income growth post-IPO than 
traditional VC-backed portfolio companies. 
VC firms have a different set of investment objectives. VC firms seek to achieve the 
highest financial return, usually through an IPO or sale of the portfolio company. Thus, a VC 
firm’s resources and contributions are geared towards this particular goal. Such resources include 
a VC firm’s strong connection to the financial markets, and contributions include the nurturing 
  
9 
of new ventures to a liquidation event. Thus, this focus on achieving financial returns should 
enable VC-backed portfolio companies to achieve higher IPO valuations and P/S valuation ratios 
than CVC-backed portfolio companies. 
H7:  Traditional VC-backed portfolio companies will have better IPO valuations as 
shown by IPO P/S ratio than CVC-backed portfolio companies. 
 As CVC-backed portfolio companies are expected to have greater sales and net income 
growth, as well as relationships with established corporations, a portfolio of CVC-backed 
portfolio companies should have lower volatility in stock price than a portfolio of VC-backed 
portfolio companies. Consequently, a portfolio of VC-backed portfolio companies should have 
higher risk (beta) and returns (alpha) than a portfolio of CVC-backed portfolio companies. 
H8: A portfolio of traditional VC-backed portfolio companies will have higher risk (beta) 
and higher returns above market (alpha) than a portfolio of CVC-backed portfolio 
companies. 
 
Methodology and Results 
Methodology 
 In order to test the proposed hypotheses, a quantitative approach was utilized. First, a 
sample of companies that went public in a specified time period was built, and revenue, net 
income, IPO valuation, and stock data was collected for each sample. Three different sources 
were used to obtain the data: 1) Hoover’s Online database for IPO and financial data, 2) SEC 
filings for pre-IPO shareholder information, and 3) Yahoo! Finance for historical stock prices. 
The years 1998, 1999, and 2002 were chosen as the time period to obtain samples from the 
technology bubble period of the late 1990s as well as the bear market in the early 2000s. For 
each sample, the company’s IPO offer and closing prices, 3-year revenues, 3-year net income, 
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principal pre-IPO stockholder, industry, and 3-year weekly stock prices were recorded. The 3-
year time horizon was chosen to try to capture company performance while the venture 
capitalist’s influence was still present in the company. 
 In order to identify companies as either VC-backed or CVC-backed, the pre-IPO 
stockholder data in the prospectus filed with the SEC was examined. VC-backed companies were 
defined as having a private partnership investment firm that focused on seed or early stage 
investments as the largest pre-IPO shareholder. CVC-backed companies were defined as either 
having the venture capital arm of a corporation as the largest pre-IPO shareholder, or having a 
corporation as the largest pre-IPO shareholder and a VC-firm as the second-largest pre-IPO 
shareholder. Companies that did not fall under one of the above categories were classified as 
either independent (independent company IPO without venture capital affiliation) or other 
(subsidiary spinoff, foreign company listing in the US, etc).  
The time frame of 1998, 1999, and 2002 yielded 600 total observations. Of the total 
sample, 131 companies were identified as VC-backed, 46 companies were identified as CVC-
backed, 251 companies were identified as independent, and 172 companies were identified as 
other. Computer software companies composed the largest percentage of both VC and CVC-
backed companies, at 32% and 17%, respectively. The computer hardware, telecommunications, 
and pharmaceutical/biotech sectors were also heavily represented. Tables 1 and 2 provide a 
summary of the data.  
 
Results 
 Four measures were calculated to test the hypotheses: 1) 3-year revenue growth, 2) 3-year 
net income growth, 3) IPO price/sales valuation at the first day closing price, and 4) 3-year stock 
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performance.  
 Three-year revenue growth was measured as the compound average growth rate of 
revenues in the three years following the IPO. Similarly, three-year net income was calculated as 
the compound average growth rate following the IPO. The price-to-sales ratio is a measurement 
of how highly the company was valued at the IPO event, calculated by dividing the closing price 
on the date of the IPO by revenue/share. Weekly stock returns were calculated using the adjusted 
weekly closing price for the three year period following the IPO. 
 For each portfolio of companies in the entire VC-backed, traditional VC-backed, CVC-
backed, or independent categories, a 95% confidence interval was used to remove outliers from 
each of the measurements. The remaining samples were used to calculate the mean, median, and 
standard deviation for each measure. The stock information for the independent portfolio was not 
calculated, as stock performance is being compared to the market. Table 3 summarizes the 
results of the analysis.  
 In order to compare performance across the different portfolios, a parametric t-test was 
utilized to compare the difference in means. The first set of comparisons created examined the 
difference between the entire VC-backed portfolio versus the independent company portfolio for 
3-year revenue growth, 3-year net income growth, and P/S ratio. 
The resulting analysis indicated that there is a significant difference in performance 
between VC-backed portfolio companies and independent companies. VC-backed companies 
experienced over double the revenue growth of independent companies, at 56.6% CAGR 
compared to 25.9% CAGR, respectively. Additionally, VC-backed companies also grew profits 
quicker than independent companies, averaging 6% CAGR compared to -26.5% CAGR. VC-
backed companies were valued much higher in an IPO event, with a 42.3x P/S multiple 
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compared to 14.5 P/S multiple. The analysis is presented in Table 4. 
The stock returns of the VC-backed portfolio were also higher than the S&P 500. In the 
three periods of 1998, 1999, and 2002, investing in a portfolio of venture-backed companies 
would have outperformed the market by over 5%, though at significantly higher risk (1.59 beta 
vs. 1.00 beta). Table 5 summarizes the stock analysis. 
Each of the first four proposed hypotheses was confirmed by the results of the analysis. 
In terms of post-IPO financial performance, IPO valuation, and stock performance, venture 
capital-backing increases the performance of the portfolio company, outperforming independent 
companies that did not have venture capital backing. Thus, this analysis confirmed the belief that 
VC-firms add value to their portfolio companies.  
Consequently, the next step was to examine the differences within the venture capital 
portfolio, between traditional VC-firms and CVC-firms. The next set of comparisons examines 
3-year revenue growth, 3-year net income growth, IPO price/sales ratio, and stock return 
measures of the traditional VC-portfolio companies to CVC-portfolio companies.  
 The resulting analysis of the VC-backed portfolio and CVC-backed portfolio both 
supported and refuted the original hypotheses. The revenue growth of VC-backed portfolio 
companies was found to be significantly higher than CVC-backed portfolio companies, at 62.5% 
CAGR compared to 40.9% CAGR, respectively. However, CVC-backed portfolio companies did 
have significantly higher net income growth compared to VC-backed portfolio companies, at 
46.5% CAGR compared to -0.5% CAGR. Additionally, the VC-backed portfolio had nearly 
twice the IPO P/S valuation than the CVC-backed portfolio, at 47.9x P/S multiple compared to 
15.9x P/S multiple. This valuation is supported by the faster growth of the VC-backed portfolio’s 
revenue growth, suggesting that the market is correct in assigning a higher P/S valuation to VC-
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backed portfolio companies. Table 6 summarizes the comparison of VC-backed to CVC-backed 
portfolios. 
 In order to analyze the stock performance of the VC-backed and CVC-backed portfolios, 
two different methods were used. First, the VC-backed and CVC-backed portfolios were further 
segmented by year of IPO, creating two sub-portfolios in each category. Then, utilizing the 
weekly adjusted returns of each company and the weekly adjusted return of the S&P 500 in the 
same period, the beta and alpha of each stock was calculated. The average return, alpha, and beta 
for each portfolio were calculated, for both the overall portfolios and sub-portfolios. The results 
of this analysis are presented in Table 9. 
 Based on the analysis, there was no significant difference found in the stock performance 
between the VC-backed and CVC-backed portfolios. However, the analysis does not support the 
initial hypothesis that VC-backed companies have better stock performance, as the VC-backed 
portfolio actually had lower alpha and beta measurements than the CVC-backed portfolio. The 
year-to-year analysis indicated that there was a significant level of variance between the 
performance in the different years, and does not provide any conclusive evidence. 
 
Discussion 
 This paper sought to compare the differences in the performance in the portfolio 
companies of VC and CVC firms. Based on the differences between VC and CVC firms in their 
investment objectives, resources, and value-added contributions, it was hypothesized that these 
differences would translate into differences in the performance of portfolio companies. Thus, 
these hypotheses were tested by comparing performance in three areas: post-IPO financial 
performance, IPO valuation, and stock performance.  
In general, the results of the analysis provide evidence both supporting and refuting the 
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original hypotheses. The analysis of the total VC-backed portfolio versus independent companies 
strongly supported the first set of hypotheses that venture-backed companies perform better than 
independent companies after becoming public and are valued higher at the IPO. The stock 
performance of the VC-backed portfolio also outperformed the market as a whole, though at a 
much greater risk level.  
This suggests that venture capitalists do add value to their portfolio companies. The 
additional resources and other value-added contributions that venture capitalists provide enable 
their portfolio companies to develop revenue growth and net income faster than independent 
companies post-IPO. Venture capital backing also leads to significantly higher IPO valuations, 
nearly three times as high. This helps contribute to the stronger stock performance of the 
venture-capital backed portfolio.    
This led to the comparison of the VC-backed and CVC-backed portfolios, seeking to 
determine if VC firms or CVC firms had different effects on their portfolio companies. It was 
hypothesized that the differences in each type of firms’ investment objectives, available 
resources, and value-added contributions would lead to different levels of performance in their 
portfolio. The analysis resulted in evidence that supported two of the original hypotheses, while 
refuted the third.  
Hypothesis 5 stated that CVC-backed portfolio companies would have faster revenue 
growth than VC-backed portfolio companies. However, the data did not support this hypothesis, 
as VC-backed companies had higher revenue growth than CVC-backed companies. There are a 
few possible explanations for this occurrence. One possible explanation is that the resources and 
value-added contributions that VC firms possess are more effective at generating revenue growth. 
VC firms typically have extensive experience in advising on developing competitive position in 
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a new market and are adept at strategic planning, as well as in the recruitment of management. It 
is likely that these contributions may help generate faster revenue growth than the contributions 
of CVC firms, the initial orders by the parent corporation and access to distribution channels. 
Another possible explanation is based on the firm’s investment objective. As VC-firms’ 
investment objective is to achieve financial returns, stronger revenue growth helps drive a higher 
valuation of a new company. Thus, VC firms may push revenue growth to achieve higher IPO 
valuations, whereas CVC firms may have more controlled growth to manage the bottom line.  
This speculation was tested in hypothesis 6, that CVC-backed portfolio companies would 
have higher net income growth than VC-backed companies. The analysis presented very strong 
evidence supporting this hypothesis, with CVC-backed portfolio companies having much higher 
net income growth compared to VC-backed portfolio firms. This result suggests that CVC firms 
are more effective at managing and cutting operating costs than VC firms. This would make 
sense, as cost cutting is a more common activity in corporate settings, and the experience of cost 
cutting initiatives in the corporate parent could carry-over into the portfolio company. 
Investment objective is again another possible contributing factor. As CVC firms invest for 
strategic purposes, the CVC firm would want to see a portfolio company reach a self-sufficiency 
point, where it can be either absorbed into the parent corporation, or serve as a supplier or 
customer in the future.   
The results of the analysis of revenue and net income suggest that VC firms are more 
concerned with and more effective at growing the top line of a new venture. Conversely, the 
CVC firm is more concerned with and more effective at growing the bottom line.  
The data also supported hypothesis 7, which stated that the VC-backed portfolio would 
have a higher IPO valuation. The price-to-sales ratio of the IPO closing price for each portfolio 
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showed a significant difference in the market valuation of the portfolio companies. The VC-
backed portfolio had a P/S multiple of nearly 48x, while the CVC-backed portfolio had a 
multiple of 16x. The market’s valuation of VC-backed companies was consequently much higher 
than CVC-backed companies. This valuation is supported by both theoretical and empirical 
evidence. It was hypothesized that VC firms would have more success at achieving a high IPO 
valuation due to their strong network in the financial market and investment goal of achieving 
the highest financial return. Additionally, the previous analysis of revenue growth also suggested 
that VC-backed companies have much faster revenue growth, and the P/S ratio would 
consequently be adjusted higher for the future growth. It is also interesting to note that the P/S 
multiple of independent companies was 14.5x, only slightly lower than the CVC portfolio, and 
the difference was not statistically significant. Thus, there is some evidence that CVC portfolio 
companies may be valued lower, closer to independent companies than traditional VC-firm 
portfolio companies.  
Another possibility is the time period and industry groups that composed the samples had 
an effect on the data sample. As a large number of the data points were obtained from the year 
1999, the excessive IPO valuation of the tech bubble could have affected the analysis. Similarly, 
a large number of the data samples were from the technology sector, which typically has higher 
multiples. This also could have affected the data analysis. 
 The results of the stock analysis were more inconclusive. While the average return, alpha, 
and beta for the CVC portfolio were higher than the VC portfolio, the difference was found to be 
insignificant. In examining the portfolio year by year, the CVC portfolio had greater returns than 
both the VC portfolio and market, but also greater losses than both the VC portfolio and the 
market in the down year. Given the results of the data analysis, no conclusive observation can be 
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made on the stock performance of the different portfolios. 
 
Implications for Entrepreneurs 
 For the entrepreneur, what do the results of this study mean? The resulting analysis 
suggests that having venture capital funding enables a new venture that goes public to have 
significantly enhanced financial performance and valuation. However, the analysis also 
suggested that the type of venture capital backing is significant as well. Choosing a traditional 
venture capital firm or a corporate venture capital firm can have a significant effect on how well 
the company performs operationally and in an initial public offering. 
 For entrepreneurs looking to achieve the highest financial return on their venture, 
accepting venture capital financing would enable the new venture to achieve the highest IPO 
valuation, especially with traditional venture capital firms. Although an entrepreneur’s stake in 
the company would be diluted by having to sell part of the company to the venture capitalist, the 
increased valuation would still provide the entrepreneur with a higher return. A quick analysis 
using the average valuation of the data sample suggests that as long as the entrepreneur retains at 
least 35% of the venture, the increased P/S valuation will create a greater return in an IPO. (See 
Figure 1.) However, the increased valuation is achieved primarily by having traditional VC 
backing, as opposed to CVC backing.  
 However, entrepreneurs that are seeking to run the company long-term may be better 
served to seek corporate venture capital financing. Given that CVC-backed companies have 
lower IPO valuations, but higher net income growth, it is more likely that CVC-backed 
companies will have more successful long-term operational success. 
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Implications for Investors 
 The stock analysis of VC-backed and CVC-backed portfolio companies indicate that 
investing in a VC-backed portfolio can possibly provide higher returns than the market as a 
whole. However, this additional gain is achieved through undertaking significantly more risk. As 
seen in the stock analysis, the VC-backed portfolio is sensitive to market conditions, and is much 
more volatile than the market. Similarly, further segmenting the portfolio by VC firms and CVC 
firms does not provide any additional returns or other advantages 
Consequently, investing solely in VC-backed portfolio is not a sound investment strategy 
for individual investors. Instead, careful fundamental analysis of the companies provide a better 
indicator of success in the marketplace. 
 
Limitations of Study and Implications for Future Research  
  There are several limitations in the study that could have affected the results of the 
analysis. The chosen years for the analysis, 1998, 1999, and 2002, represent a fairly limited set 
of data available. Given that this paper only utilized data from the years 1998, 1999, and 2002, 
expanding the analysis to include a longer time period would normalize the data and provide a 
better picture into performance over the longer period of time. 
 Another limitation of the study was the decision to examine only four areas of 
performance: revenues, net income, IPO valuation, and stock price performance. There are other 
factors that can measure the success of a new venture.  One possibility is the survival percentage 
of VC and CVC portfolio companies. This study only examined companies that went public in 
the three years of the time frame. Another measure of success would be to examine how many 
companies in VC and CVC firms’ portfolio reach the IPO stage. Similarly, the data set only 
included public offerings as an exit event. Acquisition of a portfolio firm is another way for a VC 
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firm to exit a venture, and plays a more significant role in the current environment.  
 Another area for future examination is a more qualitative study of the value-added 
contributions of venture capitalists. This study has quantitatively documented the difference in 
performance of VC and CVC-backed portfolio companies, but the methodology cannot provide a 
conclusive insight into what is the key driver of enhanced performance. A survey of management 
or case-study approach might be appropriate to examine this issue in depth. 
 
Conclusion 
 This study makes two contributions to the literature on the venture capital industry, and 
the difference between venture capital and corporate venture capital firms. The study presented a 
quantitative comparison of the performance of new companies based on venture capital backing, 
focusing on financial performance, IPO valuation, and stock performance.  
 The results of the study provides additional evidence that venture capitalists do provide 
value to their portfolio firms, generating higher revenue and net income growth and better 
valuations than independent companies. Additionally, significant differences between traditional 
venture capital and corporate venture capital firms were also documented, with each providing 
more contributions in different areas. 
 For future research, several additional analyses and recommendations were suggested. 
Expanding the study in both time period and scope would provide additional insight into the 
particular characteristics and contributions of the venture capital industry. 
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Appendix: Tables 
Table 1: Summary Description of Data Sample        
Type/Year 1998 1999 2002 Total 
CVC 10 28 8 46 
VC 31 83 17 131 
Independent 92 141 18 251 
Other 75 75 22 172 
Total 208 327 65 600 
 
Table 2: Industry Breakdown of Data Sample        
Industry CVC %Total VC %Total 
Other 2 4.35% 3 2.29% 
Aerospace & Defense 1 2.17% 0 0.00% 
Airline 0 0.00% 1 0.76% 
Business Services 1 2.17% 7 5.34% 
Business Software 0 0.00% 1 0.76% 
Computer Hardware 6 13.04% 7 5.34% 
Computer Services 0 0.00% 4 3.05% 
Computer Software 8 17.39% 42 32.06% 
Construction 0 0.00% 2 1.53% 
Consumer Product Manufacturing 0 0.00% 3 2.29% 
Consumer Products 1 2.17% 0 0.00% 
Education 0 0.00% 1 0.76% 
Electronics 4 8.70% 4 3.05% 
Financial Services 1 2.17% 3 2.29% 
Healthcare 1 2.17% 5 3.82% 
Insurance 0 0.00% 2 1.53% 
Internet Search 0 0.00% 1 0.76% 
Leisure 0 0.00% 3 2.29% 
Media 5 10.87% 8 6.11% 
Movie Theater 0 0.00% 1 0.76% 
Pharmaceuticals 5 10.87% 10 7.63% 
Restaurant 0 0.00% 1 0.76% 
Retail 4 8.70% 10 7.63% 
Telecommunications 0 0.00% 1 0.76% 
Telecommunications Equipment 1 2.17% 2 1.53% 
Telecommunications Services 4 8.70% 8 6.11% 
Telecommunications Systems 1 2.17% 0 0.00% 
Transportation Services 1 2.17% 1 0.76% 
Total 46  131  
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Table 3: Summary Statistics for Constructed Portfolios       
Independent Portfolio             
Total Sample Size 251           
  n Mean Median Deviation Min Max 
3Yr Revenue Growth 210 26% 37% -76% 179% 182% 
3Yr Income Growth 209 -27% 114% -325% 242% 260% 
P/S Ratio 153 14.5 2.1 65.5 -256.9 430.8 
Entire VC Portfolio             
Total Sample Size 177           
  n Mean Median Deviation Min Max 
3Yr Revenue Growth 143 56.6% 40.9% 65.7% -42.8% 276.6% 
3Yr Income Growth 140 6.6% 28.7% 145.2% -362.6% 366.9% 
P/S Ratio 142 42.3 15.2 121.6 -17.8 1055.9 
Weekly Stock Return 140 0.1% 0.1% 0.9% -2.3% 2.5% 
Annualized Return   5.2% 4.0%   -70.7% 263.5% 
VC Portfolio             
Total Sample Size 131           
  n Mean Median Deviation Min Max 
3Yr Revenue Growth 105 60.6% 71.3% 295.1% -42.8% 290.7% 
3Yr Income Growth 103 -0.5% 154.3% 394.8% -362.6% 366.9% 
P/S Ratio 105 47.9 132.5 1728.9 0.05 1055.9 
Weekly Stock Return 99 0.1% 0.1% 0.8% -2.3% 2.3% 
Annualized Return   2.7% 3.9%   -70.7% 220.3% 
CVC Portfolio             
Total Sample Size 46           
  n Mean Median Deviation Min Max 
3Yr Revenue Growth 31 43.4% 39.4% 223.9% -19.7% 130.2% 
3Yr Income Growth 30 46.5% 131.6% 443.6% -256.2% 440.8% 
P/S Ratio 29 15.9 19.4 1030.5 2.1 74.8 
Weekly Stock Return 41 0.2% 0.1% 1.1% -2.1% 2.5% 
Annualized Return   11.4% 3.9%   -67.1% 263.5% 
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Table 4: Difference Test for Entire VC-backed Portfolio vs Independent Portfolio    
  
VC 
Mean 
Independent 
Mean t-stat p-value Significant Difference? 
3Yr Revenue Growth 56.6% 25.9% 5.05 0.0000 Strong evidence for significant difference 
3Yr Income Growth 6.6% -26.5% 2.27 0.0240 Strong evidence for significant difference 
P/S Ratio 42.3 14.5 -2.42 0.0164 Strong evidence for significant difference 
 
Table 5: Summary Stock Return Statistics for S&P and Entire VC Portfolios    
  STDEV AVG Wkly Return Annual Return Alpha Beta 
S&P 2.53% 0.00% 0.06% 0.0000 1.0000 
VC Portfolio 15.04% 0.10% 5.20% 0.0033 1.5964 
 
Table 6: Difference Test for VC-backed vs CVC-backed Portfolio Companies    
  VC Mean CVC Mean t-stat p-value Significant Difference? 
3Yr Revenue Growth 60.6% 43.4% 2.29 0.0237 Strong evidence for significant difference 
3Yr Income Growth -0.5% 46.5% -1.28 0.2053 No significant difference 
P/S Ratio 47.9 15.9 2.40 0.0179 Strong evidence for significant difference 
 
Table 7: Difference Test for VC-backed vs Independent Companies     
  VC Mean 
Independent 
Mean t-stat p-value Significant Difference? 
3Yr Revenue Growth 60.6% 25.9% 4.81 0.0000 Strong evidence for significant difference 
3Yr Income Growth -0.5% -26.5% 1.60 0.1113 No significant difference 
P/S Ratio 47.9 14.5 -2.32 0.0218 Strong evidence for significant difference 
 
Table 8: Difference Test for CVC-backed vs Independent Companies     
  CVC Mean 
Independent 
Mean t-stat p-value Significant Difference? 
3Yr Revenue Growth 43.4% 25.9% 2.23 0.0300 Strong evidence for significant difference 
3Yr Income Growth 46.5% -26.5% 2.63 0.0116 Strong evidence for significant difference 
P/S Ratio 15.9 14.5 -1.00 0.3214 No significant difference 
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Table 9: Stock Statistics of VC and CVC-backed Companies     
Average            
Measure S&P 
VC 
Portfolio 
 CVC 
Portfolio Difference t-stat p-value VC/CVC Significant? 
Std. Dev. 2.53% 14.97% 15.22% -0.25%    
Avg Wk 
Return 0.00% 0.05% 0.21% -0.16% 0.80 0.4245 No significant difference 
Alpha 0.0000 0.0029 0.0041 -0.0012 0.75 0.4552 No significant difference 
Beta 1.0000 1.5849 1.6240 -0.0391 0.30 0.7670 No significant difference 
         
1998-2001        
Measure S&P 
VC 
Portfolio 
CVC 
Portfolio Difference t-stat p-value VC/CVC Significant? 
Std. Dev. 2.93% 5.46% 8.34% -2.88%    
Avg Wk 
Return 0.02% 0.55% 1.30% -0.75% 2.50 0.0222 
Strong evidence for significant 
difference 
Alpha 0.0000 0.0052 0.0123 -0.0070    
Beta 1.0000 1.1441 1.7597 -0.6157    
1999-2002        
Measure S&P 
VC 
Portfolio 
CVC 
Portfolio Difference t-stat p-value VC/CVC Significant? 
Std. Dev. 2.98% 9.01% 8.27% 0.74%    
Avg Wk 
Return -0.26% -0.32% -0.49% 0.17% -0.85 0.4007 
Some evidence for significant 
difference 
Alpha 0.0000 0.0017 -0.0001 0.0017    
Beta 1.0000 1.8816 1.7435 0.1381    
2002-2005        
Measure S&P 
VC 
Portfolio 
CVC 
Portfolio Difference t-stat p-value VC/CVC Significant? 
Std. Dev. 1.67% 2.89% 4.17% -1.28%    
Avg Wk 
Return 0.24% 0.63% 0.85% -0.21% 0.94 0.3671 No significant difference 
Alpha 0.0000 0.0034 0.0060 -0.0026    
Beta 1.0000 1.2129 1.1111 0.1017    
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Figure 1: Value of IPO Event to Entrepreneur        
Value of IPO to Entrepreneur
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